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NOTES
therefore, that only those distribution methods which in themselves con-
stitute Clayton Act violations or contracts in restraint of trade should be
proscribed under the antitrust laws. For this position, it may be further
argued that to impose restrictions upon a leasing system as a remedial
measure for Sherman Act problems stemming from sources other than
the system itself is to invoke a remedy whose effectiveness is uncertain
at best and that such problems are properly handled by divestiture, dis-
solution or public regulation.
This argument has force, but, unfortunately the problem of fashion-
ing suitable remedies in non-competitive industrial situations is not an
easy one. Neither the government and courts nor the public are yet per-
suaded that drastic remedies are called for in these situations; further,
this survey shows little evidence that business has been unfairly or arbi-
trarily deprived of the advantages of the leasing device in those cases
where it has been restricted as a part of the overall remedial scheme for
Sherman Act violations. Thus, until better methods of establishing com-
petitive industrial conditions are devised it will be necessary for those
who fashion decrees to retain an acute awareness of the delicate balance
which must be achieved if industrial marketers and their lessees are to
obtain the economic advantages of leasing.
USE OF SUBNORMAL MENTALITY TO DISCREDIT
Any witness is competent to give testimony who possesses minimum
powers of observation, recollection and narration.' The liberal eviden-
tiary rules prescribing what this minimum shall be, however, permit the
introduction of many witnesses whose powers of observation, recollec-
tion and narration2 are far below normal.3  For example, challenges to
competency have failed to bar testimony by an inmate of a home for
feeble-minded,4 by an epileptic girl with immature mental development,5
and by a seriously insane inmate in a mental hospital.6 Because evidence
of mental deficiency in competency hearings is not considered by the
1. 2 WIGmo,0E, EVIDENCE § 478 (3d ed. 1940).
2. The ability to communicate is seldom a problem necessitating the use of experts
since poor speaking or hearing abilities can be detected by a lay jury easily.
3. State v. Wildman, 145 Ohio 379, 61 N.E.2d 790 (1945).
4. People v. Lambersky, 410 Ill. 451, 102 N.E.2d 326 (1951).
5. State v. Williams, 111 Utah 379, 180 P.2d 551 (1947).
6. District of Columbia v. Arms, 107 U.S. 519 (1883).
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jury,7 the party opposing the witness must find other methods if the ex-
tent of his low intelligence or poor memory is to be presented to the jury
for their use in evaluating the weight the witness' testimony should be
given.8 Cross-examination and the use of extrinsic evidence to discredit'
are the two methods by which the nature of the deficiency can be shown
to the jury. Normally, opposing counsel is permitted considerable lati-
tude in cross-examining witnesses," which frequently enables him to
demonstrate the witness' deficiency in testimonial powers." The real
problem arises when the opposing counsel attempts to disclose similar
witness inadequacies by extrinsic evidence. Whether this method may
be used to discredit and, if permitted, the limitations on its use, are ques-
tions about which there remains doubt.
Lay witnesses can normally testify to impaired intelligence or poor
memory for the purpose of discrediting a witness if the deficiency is so
serious that it amounts to insanity. Thus lay witnesses were allowed to
testify that a suspect witness had an "imbecile mind and memory"'12 and
that a witness was mentally deficient when the testimony was offered
with evidence of prior committal to a mental institution.'" The courts
have, on the other hand, almost uniformly refused to permit a lay witness
to testify to mental deficiency below normal yet not amounting to in-
sanity,' even though the "mind has been affected for a number of years
with a degree of imbecility to the extent almost of insanity."'" The ration-
ale for excluding such evidence was pointed out in a Colorado decision.
Men differ in grades of intelligence as blades of grass in
7. 3 JONES, EVIDENCE § 815 (5th ed. 1958). Nor can the jury decide the question
of a witness' competency. Competency is solely for the court.
8. "The modern tendency is to avoid treating insanity as a cause of total incom-
petency as a witness, and to leave the defect in question to have whatever weight it
deserves as discrediting the witness' powers of observation, rcollection, or communica-
tion." Taborsky v. State, 142 Conn. 619, 629, 116 A.2d 433, 437 (1955).
9. As a method of discrediting a witness, evidence of low intelligence or poor
memory differs from normal impeachment (bias, interest, prior inconsistent statements
or general community reputation for veracity). The latter shows motive or tendency
to be untruthful; the former shows varying degrees of inability to describe accurately,
although not such a degree as to render incompetent. Using the term impeachment to
describe both creates no problem unless impeachment is construed to mean only un-
truthfulness; if used in its general sense of discrediting a witness, it covers both areas.
10. Allen v. State, 60 Ala. 19 (1877) ; Ah Tong v. Earl Fruit Co., 112 Cal. 679,
45 Pac. 7 (1896).
11. But the existence of low intelligence or varying degrees of poor memory is not
always easily determined from appearances by the attorney or a lay jury. OVERHOLSER
& RIcHMOND, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHrATRY 51 (1947).
12. Rivara v. Ghio, 3 E.D. Smith (N.Y.) 264 (1854).
13. Ellarson v. Ellarson, 198 App. Div. 103, 190 N.Y.S. 6 (3d Dep't 1921).
14. Blanchard v. People, 70 Colo. 555, 203 Pac. 662 (1922) ; Goodwyn v. Goodwyn,
20 Ga. 600 (1856).
15. Phillips v. Short, 2 Harr. (Del.) 339 (1841).
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appearance. The utter unreliability of such testimony is at once
apparent, when we remember that every man's opinion of the
intelligence of others is largely controlled by the quality of his
own. To his neighbors John Smith may have seemed a man of
average intelligence, though Herbert Spencer may have deemed
him a fool."
The courts have recognized that a lay witness can not measure adequately
the degree of subnormal intelligence or memory power or give the extent
to which the impairment affects the witness' testimonial reliability. The
distinction which has been drawn by the courts would seem to mean that
lay witnesses can testify only in the most obvious cases, i.e., where a wit-
ness is almost incompetent but where the courts feel bound to admit the
witness because he is the only one available or because his impairment is
recognized and his testimony easily weighed by the jury.'7
On the other hand, the North Carolina Supreme Court permitted
lay testimony of "memory below medium" in Isler v. Dewey,'8 even
though the witness' defect did not amount to insanity. Although the
court in that case restricted its discussion first to attacks on credibility
of makers of wills and deeds-an area where lay testimony might be
admissible because of the common law tradition to permit lay opinions
of decedent's mind in will contests-it expanded the language later to in-
clude any person whose memory was naturally weak, saying:
. . . his testimony will naturally have less weight with a
jury than if his memory was sound and unimpaired. To prove
of a witness that his memory is weak, is a legitimate way of
impeaching his testimony, and the opinions of those who knew
him may be resorted to for that purpose."x
Dicta in an early Indiana case2' indicates that the Indiana Supreme
Court would have permitted such testimony if the question had been pre-
sented to them at the time, regardless of the presence or absence of san-
ity. Because of the strong majority of courts which disapprove the ad-
mission of lay testimony and the scientific inability of a lay witness to
16. Blanchard v. People, 70 Colo. 555, 203 Pac. 662 (1922).
17. A lay witness' testimony on low intelligence or poor memory might be admis-
sible as a part of the foundation laid for asking a psychologist a hypothetical question
on whether such intelligence testimony, coupled with his court room observations of the
suspect witness, would render the witness' testimony unreliable.
18. 75 N.C. 466 (1876). Similar testimony was admitted in State v. Witherspoon,
210 N.C. 647, 188 S.E. 111 (1926), and Bouldin v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 419, 222 S.W.
555 (1920).
19. Id. at 467.
20. Carpenter v. Dame, 10 Ind. 94 (1858).
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detect varying degrees of mental impairment between the normal and the
completely insane,2 1 the Indiana court would probably exclude the evi-
dence today.22
Broad language used by some of the courts in rejecting lay testi-
mony has been carried over to influence the admissibility of expert testi-
mony offered to discredit. For example, the court, in Bell v. Rinner,"
failed to confine its opinion to the issue and used general language to in-
dicate disapproval of expert as well as lay testimony:
Moreover, if it be conceded that the credibility of a wit-
ness is to be graded in proportion to his strength of intellect,
the tribunal before which he testifies can better estimate his
capacity, and the weight to which his testimony is entitled,
by his manner, and by his statements on cross-examination,
than can, ordinarily, be done by the testimony and conflicting
opinions of other witnesses, as to the extent of his mental
powers, or the degree of his intelligence.2"
A similar rule was reiterated in Blanchard v. People2 ' where the state at-
tempted to impeach a defense witness in a forgery prosecution. The
appellate court reversed the conviction because the state's witnesses were
allowed to testify about a defense witness' "low order of intelligence."
This case has twice been said to stand for the rule that evidence on intel-
lectual deficiency of a witness is inadmissible,2" an interpretation which
appears erroneous. 27
The California courts have consistently refused to admit expert
testimony 2l on subnormal intelligence and have followed the reasoning
21. The use of the word "insanity" in the cases appears to be a broad way to define
intelligence so low or memory so poor as to render a witness untrustworthy for all but
the most elementary testimony. The word "insanfiy" does not mean insanity in the
psychiatric sense. This paper does not propose to examine the question of whether
psychiatric evidence showing tendencies to be untruthful is admissible. For discussions
on this subject, see Note, 13 RUTGERS L. REv. 330 (1958), or Comment, 59 YALE L.J.
1324 (1950).
22. The lay witness is not competent to determine the degree of intellectual dis-
ability and the relation such disability has on the powers required to make a testimonial
assertion reliable.
23. 16 Ohio St. 45 (1864).
24. Id. at 47.
25. 70 Colo. 555, 203 Pac. 662 (1922).
26. "The claim of insanity, that is, gross inadequacy amounting to mental defici-
ency, was required in order to attack credibility by reason of lack of intelligence." Red-
mount, The Psychological Basis of Evidence Practices: Intelligence, 42 MINN. L. REV.
559, 567 (1958). See also, Note, 13 RUTGmRs L. REv. 330 (1958).
27. See footnotes 34 and 54 infra and accompanying text.
28. People v. Champion, 193 Cal. 441, 225 Pac. 278 (1924) ; People v. Dye, 81 Cal.
App. 2d 952, 185 P.2d 624 (1947) ; People v. Harrison, 18 Cal. App. 288, 123 Pac. 200
(1912). These cases relied heavily upon the California statute setting out the ways to
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of the majority of cases excluding lay testimony.29 Pennsylvania" and
West Virginia"' have also excluded expert testimony offered to impeach
the testimonial ability of opposing witnesses 
'ost of the cases indicating that expert testimony should be ex-
cluded, for one reason or another, should be accorded little precedent
value. One of the leading cases, almost one hundred years old, was de-
cided long before the development of modern psychology.3 Another
has been misinterpreted and too much reliance placed upon the general
language used by the court. 4 Finally, similar evidence of subnormal in-
telligence has been offered to support conclusions of sexual perversion,
habitual lying or the lack of veracity of a witness." The attorneys in
the latter cases attempted to impute psychiatric effects to psychological
causes where no such relation exists. 6 There is no psychological proof
that subnormal mental abilities cause untruthfulness.
There is a great deal of direct case support for the proposition that
expert testimony is admissible in various situations. Medical testimony
pointing out the intellectual deficiency of a witness has been admitted
most frequently in criminal cases. In one case, the court asked:
What could be more effective for the purpose than to im-
peach the mentality or the intellectual grasp of a witness? If
his interest, bias, indelicate way of life, insobriety and general
impeach. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2051-52. They looked at impeachment more in its
traditional sense as tending to attack veracity. The first case is explainable, in part,
because the expert was asked about the suspect witness' "proclivity for theft." This
would appear to be an attempt to introduce specific facts in lieu of general community
reputation, which is inadmissible, and would support the court's reluctance to allow the
other testimony. Moreover there is no causal connection between low intelligence and
proclivity for theft.
29. See text accompanying footnotes 12-15 supra.
30. Commonwealth v. Myers, 5 Pa. D. & C. 410 (1924).
31. State v. Driver, 88 W. Va. 479, 107 S.E. 189 (1921).
32. The general language of these two cases is not supported by the way in which
the question was presented and neither case is strong support for the position that
expert discrediting testimony is inadmissible. See text accompanying footnotes 35 and
36 infra.
33. Bell v. Rinner, 16 Ohio St. 45 (1864).
34. Blanchard v. People, 70 Colo. 555, 203 Pac. 662 (1922). The court expressly
reserved its opinion on whether evidence given by experts or evidence of low intelligence
about a witness whose testimony involved very complex transactions would be admis-
sible. See footnote 54 infra alsc,.
35. Commonwealth v. Myers, 5 Pa. D. & C. 410 (1924); State v. Driver, 88 W.
Va. 479, 107 S.W. 189 (1921).
36. The only theory on which such an interpretation could have been supported is
that low intelligence tends to create emotional disturbances within the mentally deficient
child and that the effect which the physician testified to is explained by the resulting
neurosis or psychosis. That psychiatric problems may be aggravated because of low in-
telligence is supported by authority. See NoYEs & KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHrATRY
335 (5th ed. 1959).
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bad reputation in the community may be shown as bearing up-
on his untrustworthiness of belief, why not his imbecility, want
of understanding, or moronic comprehension, which go more
directly to the point ?
On this and similar reasoning, physicians have been allowed to testify
that the mental development of a prosecuting witness in a rape case was
"considerably below the average;"38 that a co-indictee turned state's wit-
ness in an arson prosecution was a moron with the mind of a nine or ten
year old child ;39 and that the state's eyewitness to a homicide was a low-
class moron, with the mind of a nine year old.4"
Teachers, too, may be permitted to qualify as experts and give testi-
mony on their pupils' lack of intelligence when the child's credibility is
sought to be impeached. To qualify as an expert, the teacher would need
special training in psychology, which many of them receive. Their testi-
mony as experts would be restricted, of course, to children's intelligence
and memory powers. A Wexler Intelligence Scale for Children score,
and testimony by a teacher41 to the effect that a nine year old alleged
sodomy victim was easily dominated, could be made to believe anything,
and could not remember events of an eight hour day without prompting
were said to be admissible within the discretion of the trial court.42 Tes-
timony by a third grade teacher43 that a twelve year old prosecuting wit-
ness in an attempted rape prosecution was two years behind in school
work and "subnormal mentally" was indicated in dicta also to be admis-
sible44 to impeach the child's credibility. 5
The admission of similar testimony in civil proceedings has been
favorably commented upon by only one court. Although the issue was
the competency of a sole eyewitness to an automobile accident, the court
37. State v. Armstrong, 232 N.C. 727, 728-29, 62 S.E.2d 50, 51 (1950).
38. Jeffers v. State, 145 Ga. 74, 88 S.E. 571 (1916).
39. People v. Hudson, 341 Ill. 187, 173 N.E. 278 (1930).
40. State v. Armstrong, 232 N.E. 727, 62 S.E.2d 50 (1950).
41. In this particular case, the teacher was headmaster at a boys school for the
blind. Probably he was trained in psychological testing since he administered the test
about which the testimony centered.
42. Mangrum v. State, 227 Ark. 318, 299 S.W.2d 80 (1957).
43. Normally, an elementary school teacher has considerably less psychological
training, it is supposed, than a teacher at a school for the blind. Testimony by such a
teacher, in fact, may be little more than lay testimony, depending on the extent of the
teacher's actual training and study in the discipline.
44. State v. Teagor, 222 Iowa 391, 269 N.E. 348 (1936).
45. Some of the cases indicate that unless a challenge to competency is made or a
competency hearing is held, the opposing party may not introduce expert testimony to
discredit. State v. Teagor, 222 Iowa 391, 269 N.W. 348 (1936); Bell v. Rinner, 16
Ohio St. 45 (1864). There would appear to be no valid reason for requiring such an
attack before allowing expert testimony since the theory upon which the testimony is
introduced is that the inadequacies are not sufficient to exclude.
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indicated that medical testimony classifying plaintiff's witness as a low-
grade moron with a mental age of seven should have been allowed to
impeach his credibility. Defendant offered his evidence only to attack
competency and by his failure to introduce it to impeach, forced the court
to affirm plaintiff's verdict." The courts will probably be more reluc-
tant to admit evidence of low intelligence in civil cases than in criminal
prosecutions.
Whether evidence of low intelligence should be admitted to discredit
a witness depends on whether there is a correlation between the low in-
tellect and the adequacy of testimonial powers and the degree of precision
with which this correlation can be measured. That there is a correlation,
the psychologists agree. "Intelligence" includes the processes of percep-
tion, conception, attention, memory, imagery, ideation, judgment, rea-
soning and inventiveness.4 A witness whose intelligence is subnormal
must consequently possess subnormal testimonial powers in one form
or another.
The fact that lay witnesses can not differentiate between degrees of
intelligence and correlate intelligence with degrees of testimonial power
is the primary reason why their testimony is not permitted. By using
a few of the many tests available48 psychologists,49 as trained observers,
are able to determine the degree of subnormality, perhaps not to the
extent of absoluteness"0 but certainly adequate to provide the jury with
a valuable tool for evaluating testimony given by a suspect witness. The
psychologist is much more adequately equipped to measure low intelli-
gence or poor memory and show its relation to the deficiency in testi-
monial powers than is the cross-examiner. Any witness scoring less than
65 on the Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Scale, for example, can be ex-
pected to possess less than the normal testimonial powers. Such a person,
it has been shown, can not be expected to make a good economic adjust-
ment to life, may possess defective judgment, and will probably be easily
46. McCrary v. Ogden, 267 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1954).
47. TREDGOLD, MENTAL DEFICIENCY 52 (9th ed. 1956) ; Redmount, The Psychologi-
cal Basis of Evidence Practices: Intelligence, 42 MINN. L. REv. 559, 587 (1958).
48. E.g., Sanford-Binet Test for children and the Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence
Scale for Adults are the two best known. GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND
THE LAW 180 (1952).
49. Psychologists have been admitted as experts in other situations. E.g., Watson
v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 5, 273 S.W.2d 879 (1954) (testified to sanity). They would
evidently be qualified to testify as experts on intelligence.
50. The tests' conclusiveness is limited by certain emotional and environmental fac-
tors on the part of the subject. These can, however, be taken into account by a compe-
tent test administrator if he has the opportunity to observe the subject during the test
and interview him and others for his case history. GuTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHI-
ATRY AND THE LAW 180 (1952) ; Redmount, The Psychological Basis of Evidence Prac-
tices: Intelligence, 42 MINN. L. REv. 559, 580 (1958).
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led. 1 He may be a poor observer and his interpretations, based on rea-
soning, will frequently be unsatisfactory." If the possession of a par-
ticular testimonial power is more important to his testimony than others,
e.g., memory, a special test designed to measure this single faculty may be
administered 3 and the results will be even more determinative than those
of the general intelligence examination.
The fact that a witness has a low measurable intelligence is not
enough in itself to discredit his testimony. The party seeking to discredit
the witness must show that his low intelligence or poor memory directly
negatives reliability on the particular set of facts about which the wit-
ness testifies. Although a witness has subnormal intelligence, the evi-
dence which he proposes to give may require only a bare minimum of
testimonial skills. For example, questioning a witness as to "Who
struck you?" may require nothing more than the answer "He did." Or
a witness, whose deposition54 is taken at the scene of an accident, may be
able to relate the facts of the injuries long before the facts are blurred by
his faulty memory. At times, a more complex set of testimonial skills
may be needed, as when a witness testifies that a party executed a will
and a number of intertwining trusts, testifies about the contents of the
instruments, and testifies about the maker's intent. In the latter example
almost any subnormality would cast doubt upon the witness' ability to
report accurately; more complex knowledge would be required to show
that a witness' testimony in the other examples could not be relied upon.
Using tests and observations and, perhaps, lay testimony given in
court about the suspected witness' environment and past conduct as foun-
dation for the expert's testimony,5 the psychologist can determine ac-
curately the degree of subnormal intelligence or poor memory and relate
51. GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 180 (1952). See also
NOYES & KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 324 (5th ed. 1959).
52. Mack, Forensic Psychiatry and the Witness-A Survey, 7 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV.
302,'312 (1958).
53. -E.g., the Wechsler Memory Scale, when properly administered, is very reli-
able. Redmount, The Psychological Basis of Evidence Practices: Memory, 50 J. CRIM.
L., C. & P.S. 249, 259 (1959).
54. That the witness' testimony was recorded by deposition would go far to pre-
clude the use of expert testimony, particularly if it were the powers of memory which
the opposing party sought to attack. Rather than show testimonial powers so poor that
the witness could not remember from the time of the accident to the trial, the oppos-
ing party would have to show that he could not remember from accident to deposition,
perhaps a day later. Blanchard v. People, 70 Colo. 555, 203 Pac. 662 (1922), pointed
this out. Partly for this reason, the precedent value of the case to support a rigid ex-
clusionary rule is weakened.
55. See footnote 17 supra. In one case where expert testimony was admitted, the
court also admitted lay testimony. People v. Hudson, 341 Ill. 187, 173 N.E. 278 (1930).
Although the court did not give a reason for doing so, the case might be valuable as
a precedent for the admission of lay evidence as a foundation upon which the expert
can base his opinion.
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it to the testimonial skills required for particular testimony. This expert
evidence should be admitted at any time when the witness' credibility is
vital to the outcome of the case. Psychologists, however, are infrequently
offered as discrediting witnesses." The courts have had to determine
generally whether similar evidence is admissible when given by physi-
cians and teachers. To the extent that non-psychologists are trained to
measure and observe the degree of subnormal intelligence or memory,
their evidence would appar to be as valuable as that of the psychologist,
particularly when the testimony to be discredited requires complex testi-
monial skills." If the court is not satisfied with the physician's or
teacher's psychological training, the evidence should be treated exactly
like lay testimony and excluded. Offered in proper cases, the evidence
of psychologists and those trained in the field can be of great value to the
jury in their evaluation of the weight to be given a witness' testimony.
SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS IN THE INDIANA LEGISLATIVE
PROCESSt
The Indiana legislative process is governed largely by provisions of
the Indiana Constitution of 1851.' Although these provisions may have
been adequate when adopted, students of governmental procedure express
concern over the adequacy of many of these measures to cope with the
state's legislative problems more than a century later.' The Indiana legis-
lature is confronted with problems in several areas which could be rem-
edied to a great extent by revising certain portions of the existing legis-
56. There are no cases where trained psychologists, except the teacher-psycholo-
gist in Mangrum v. State, 227 Ark. 318, 299 S.W.2d 80 (1957), have given evidence
on the intelligence or memory of a witness for impeachment purposes. Probably one
of the reasons for this non-use is the inability of the opposing party to get an intelligence
or memory test from the suspected witness. Unless there are old test results from the
psychologist to interpret, the psychologist's testimony would have to be based only on
hypothetical questions and observations.
57. Psychologists, too, can give the most accurate evidence of a witness' relia-
bility when a more complex use of testimonial skills is required. Redmount, The Psy-
chological Basis of Evidence Practices: Intelligence, 42 MINN. L. REV. 559, 589-90
(1958).
t The following note was prepared by and expresses the views of Birch E. Bayh,
Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives of the 91st General Assembly of Indiana(1959). Mr. Bayh was first elected to the House in 1955 and has served continuously
since that time. He was minority floor leader in 1957 and is currently vice-chairman
of the Indiana Legislative Advisory Commission.
1. IND. CONsT. art. 4.
2. CoUxciL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, OuR STATE LEGISLATURE 4 (1948); Willbern
and Clark, Pre-legislative Conferences in Indiana, STATE GOV'T 43 (Winter 1949).
